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REPL ACING BAT TLESHIPS WITH AIRCR AFT
C ARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC IN WORLD WAR II
Thomas C. Hone

T

his is a case study of operational and tactical innovation in the U.S. Navy
during World War II. Its purpose is to erase a myth—the myth that Navy
tactical and operational doctrine existing at the time of Pearl Harbor facilitated
a straightforward substitution of carriers for the battleship force that had been
severely damaged by Japanese carrier aviation on 7 December 1941. That is not
what happened. What did happen is much more interesting than a simple substitution of one weapon for another. As Trent Hone put it in 2009, “By early 1943,
a new and more effective fleet organization had become available.” This more
effective fleet, “built around carrier task forces,” took the operational initiative
away from the Japanese and spearheaded the maritime assault against Japan. 1
This was clearly innovation—something new. But it was not an outright rejection of the past. Instead, it was a mixture of innovation and adaptation, drawing
on existing doctrine where that made sense and creating new doctrine where that
was called for. The end result was the foundation of the U.S. Navy that is familiar
to us today.2
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PRE–WORLD WAR II CARRIER CONCEPTS
In the fall of 1937, then-captain Richmond K. Turner,
a member of the faculty of the Naval War College, presented a lecture entitled “The Strategic Employment
of the Fleet.” His argument was straightforward: “The
chief strategic function of the fleet is the creation of situations that will bring about decisive battle, and under
conditions that will ensure the defeat of the enemy.”3
1
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Aircraft carriers had an important role to play, especially by raiding enemy forces
and bases. As Turner pointed out, raids could “inflict serious damage” on an
enemy and “gain important information.” At the same time, carrier raids could
“carry the threat of permanency or future repetition.” Turner argued that raids
were “a distinct type of operation” and that raiding “occupies a tremendously
important place in naval warfare.”4
In his 1937 pamphlet “The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare,” Turner
recognized that the performance of carrier planes had improved and was still
improving, which meant that “nothing behind the enemy front is entirely secure
from observation and attack.” Improved performance also implied that carrier
aircraft could put air bases on land out of commission and achieve “command of
the air” in a region. War games and exercises that set one carrier against another
were misleading. “For us to attain command of the air around a hostile fleet in
its own home waters we must not only destroy its carrier decks, but also all the
airdromes or land-based aviation in its vicinity.”5
What aviation had brought to naval warfare, according to Turner, was not only
the ability to strike enemy ships and bases from the sea but, especially, the ability
to gain information about the enemy while preventing the enemy from doing the
same with regard to friendly forces. But gaining control of the air would not be
possible if a fleet’s air units were dispersed or spread among too many missions.
As he put it, “We should, as with other means of action, be sure to employ a concentration of enough airplanes to produce the desired effect.”6
But how was that concentration to be achieved? Turner admitted that there
“seems to be no one best place to locate our carriers to prevent the enemy from
destroying them,” and he acknowledged that exercises had demonstrated that
carriers were most valuable as offensive weapons.7 The fleet problems had shown
that the side that found and attacked the other side’s carrier or carriers had a
great advantage thereafter.8 But how could carriers best be protected? How could
they be supported logistically? It was well understood by combat aviators that
more fighter aircraft did not necessarily translate into an automatic advantage in
air-to-air combat. Numbers had to be translated into combat power through the
use of proper scouting, bombing, and air-to-air combat tactics. The same notion
applied to carriers. There were simply not enough carriers before World War II
to know how best to maneuver and employ clusters of them.9
Despite the unknowns associated with aircraft carrier operations, U.S. carrier
doctrine was relatively advanced by April 1939, when Vice Admiral Ernest J. King,
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, issued the guidance document “Operations
with Carriers.” For example, it defined the primary mission of carrier aircraft
as gaining and maintaining “control of the air in the theatre of naval operations. Missions of a defensive nature militate against the accomplishment of this
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/6
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mission.” If the limited number of carriers went off to conduct a major raid, the
battleship force would have to accept the risk.10
“Operations with Carriers,” which drew its inferences from the evidence provided by the Navy’s fleet problems, also noted that successful carrier raids against
land bases and targets were “practicable.” However, experience in exercises had
shown that carriers operating in close support of an amphibious operation “are
usually considered important objectives by the enemy and are usually destroyed
before the completion of the operations. This follows largely from a lack of strategical mobility” of the carriers.11 In addition, there was no certain way to know
how to position carriers once they were conducting flight operations. To handle
aircraft, carriers had to steam into the wind and maintain a constant course until
all were launched or taken aboard. That might make them particularly vulnerable
to attack by enemy aircraft, submarines, or even surface ships.
Despite the unknowns attached to carrier operations, several things were clear
from the prewar fleet problems. First, it was essential for any carrier to get in the
first strike against an enemy. That was because carriers under concerted air attack
were almost impossible to defend.12 Second, therefore, it was critical to conduct
effective scouting in order to find the enemy’s carriers first. Third, carriers did not
belong in night surface engagements. As Fleet Tactical Publication 143 (War Instructions) of 1934 put it, “Aircraft carriers should endeavor to avoid night action
with all types of enemy vessels and should employ every means, speed, guns, and
smoke, to assist them in this endeavor.”13 This meant that carriers would have to
operate separate from battleships at night if there were any possibility of a night
surface engagement. But how were the movements of these separate forces to be
coordinated? Fourth, tying the carriers to an amphibious operation involved very
high risk. Carriers were safest and most effective if they were allowed to roam and to
attack—to take, and then stay on, the offensive.
U.S. CARRIER OPERATIONS IN 1942
In 1942, U.S. carriers in the Pacific performed the missions foreseen before the
war:

• Raids. Strikes were flown on the Marshalls and Gilberts in February and
then attacks on Wake and Marcus Islands. Lae and Salamaua were struck
on 10 March, and Task Force (TF) 16 carried Army twin-engine bombers to
within striking range of Tokyo on 18 April.

• Ambushes. The battle of the Coral Sea (4–8 May) was an attempted U.S.
Navy carrier ambush of a Japanese carrier force covering an amphibious operation. Midway (3–6 June) was also an American ambush, but of the main
Japanese carrier force.14
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• Covering invasion forces. Around Guadalcanal, at the battles of the Eastern
Solomons (23–25 August) and Santa Cruz (26–27 October), U.S. and Japanese carrier forces fought with one another and with land-based air units to
gain and hold air superiority. U.S. forces sought to hold Henderson Field;
the Japanese land and sea forces struggled to take it or permanently close it.
Both sides used carrier aviation to cover amphibious operations and raid the
enemy’s carriers.
There was nothing doctrinally new in these critical battles. As the late Clark
Reynolds demonstrated in 1994, Admiral King’s strategy in the Pacific was to
maintain an aggressive and active “fleet in being” in order to hinder and harass
the Japanese.15 King’s direction to Admiral Chester Nimitz to take calculated
risks meant that Nimitz and his subordinates would use carrier task forces at
the operational level of war to raid critical Japanese targets and then retreat. For
their part, to forestall future raids, the more numerous Japanese carriers would
attempt to destroy the U.S. carriers. That could (and did) set the stage for U.S.
ambushes. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway were tactical ambushes that
attained Admiral Nimitz’s operational-level goals. “By the middle of July 1942,
Admirals King and Nimitz therefore had four carriers . . . with which to defend
Hawaii and Australia against Japan’s two surviving heavies and three light carriers. The odds were even.”16
However, defending the U.S. force that had invaded Guadalcanal placed
American carrier commanders in the vulnerable position of staying near enough
to the amphibious assault to defend it. That was not what the 1939 “Operations
with Carriers” had recommended. It was essential for U.S. forces on Guadalcanal
to get land-based aviation up and running from Henderson Field so that carriers
could roam and raid. The Japanese knew that and therefore used their forces to
try to prevent it. So long as Guadalcanal was being contested, U.S. carriers would
have to stay near enough to the island to shield it from Japanese attacks; they
would have one foot nailed to Guadalcanal, while their opponents could maneuver freely. As a consequence, the U.S. Navy lost two carriers and saw Enterprise
put out of action for over three months.
Thinking about carrier operations continued even as the battles raged. As John
Lundstrom has discovered, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher put together a concept of optimal carrier tactics in September 1942, and Nimitz passed Fletcher’s
assessment on to Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, the area commander, who apparently “concurred with most of Fletcher’s positions.”17 Nimitz took Fletcher’s
comments, Halsey’s reaction, “and extracts from action reports of the 26 October
Santa Cruz battle” and sent them “to all Pacific Fleet aviation type commanders, task force commanders, carrier captains, and others . . . who led carriers in
battle.”18 Nimitz invited comments, and he got them.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/6
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At about the same time, Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, who had captained Lexington at Coral Sea and was now Halsey’s subordinate, developed a
paper entitled “Principles of Handling Carriers.” When he took command of Task
Force 16—built around carrier Enterprise—on 24 November 1942, he gave his
subordinates copies of this paper “with elaboration.”19 By 1 December, according
to Sherman, he had a rough draft of a means of using fighters to defend carriers.20 On 16 December, Sherman learned that he would also get command of the
newly repaired Saratoga; he wrote, “Now is my chance to operate a two-carrier
task force which I have been advocating since the war started over a year ago.”21
On the 18th he noted that it was necessary “for two carrier task forces operating
together to shake down if they are to do it efficiently,” and on 28 December he told
his diary, “Have been drawing up a plan for operating a five-carrier task force. It
looks feasible and fine for defense. It is the only way the air groups of 5 carriers
can be conducted. I hope to get a chance to try it out.”22
Sherman would have an uphill struggle. Opinion about the optimal size of
carrier task forces was divided among the senior carrier and carrier task force
commanders. As the staff history of the fast carrier task force prepared in 1945
by the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) would point out,
Vice Admiral Fletcher disagreed with his subordinate, Captain Arthur C. Davis,
who had commanded Enterprise in the Eastern Solomons battle. Davis argued
that “the joint operation of more than two carrier task forces is too unwieldy.
This applies to both the inherent lags in visual communications and the lags and
complications in tactical handling.” Davis did not think that changes in doctrine
and training could eliminate these problems.23 Fletcher replied, “Our recent experience indicate[s] that three carrier task forces can be handled almost as easily
as two; and I feel certain that four could be operated together without too much
difficulty.”24
But Captain Davis, not so optimistic, was particularly concerned about keeping carriers separate when they were being attacked by enemy aircraft. As he said,
“it should unquestionably be the exception rather than the rule that carrier task
forces operating jointly be less than ten miles apart, and this distance should be
of the order of fifteen or twenty miles when action is thought to be imminent.”
Fletcher countered, “To an attacking air group, it makes little difference whether
the carriers are separated by 5 or 20 miles but to the defenders it makes a great
deal. By keeping the carriers separated 15–20 miles there is always the danger that
the full fighter force may not be brought to bear decisively against the enemy attack as happened at Midway.”25
After the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the still-unresolved debate carried
on. Rear Admiral George D. Murray, who had lost Hornet, his flagship, to Japanese bomb and torpedo attacks, argued that two-carrier task forces were too slow
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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to take the offensive when that was imperative. Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid,
who had commanded the Enterprise task force, did not agree. His position was
that “by having two carriers together one carrier can take care of all routine flying
while the other maintains her full striking group spotted and ready to launch on
short notice.”26 As Lundstrom finds, there was no consensus among the carrier
and task force commanders, “with opinion almost equally divided between concentration and dispersion.”27
1943: THINGS CHANGE
A number of ideas, technologies, and significant people came together in the
spring of 1943 in a way that would begin to change dramatically first carrier task
forces and eventually the Navy.
The people first. Admiral Nimitz was still looking for an assessment of carrier
doctrine and tactics based on the experiences of the previous year. Vice Admiral
John Towers, the Navy’s senior aviator, was committed to giving it to him. But
Towers was not the only senior aviator reviewing what had been learned during
carrier operations in 1942. In his diary entry for 20 January 1943, Rear Admiral
Sherman had noted that he and Vice Admiral Halsey “agreed perfectly” on carrier
tactics. By 15 March 1943, however, Sherman—the champion of maneuvering
multiple carriers together in coherent task forces—had received a letter from
Halsey “reversing himself on separation of carriers to receive attack.” Sherman
regarded Halsey’s revised views as “unsound.”28 The disagreement between them
shows how uncertain the matter was.
As historian Lundstrom notes, “The key problem was coordinating simultaneous flight operations from different carriers.” Sherman and his chief of
staff, Captain Herbert S. Duckworth, working with Commander Robert Dixon,
Enterprise’s air operations officer, organized exercises to show that this could be
done—that carriers steaming together could launch and recover aircraft without
their air groups interfering with one another.29 Sherman’s goal was clear—“to
create a standardized doctrine so that different carriers could swiftly integrate
into a powerful task force.”30
What Sherman and Duckworth had to modify were the “Standard Cruising
Instructions for Carrier Task Forces” of 1 January 1943. Those instructions assumed that there would usually be no more than two carriers in a task force. With
two carriers, one could send up inner air patrols, scouting flights, and—when
required—a combat air patrol, while the other carrier’s air group stood ready
to launch strikes. The two carriers could rotate between being the “duty carrier”
and the strike carrier. The ships in the task force would exercise with the carriers
until they could “turn with the duty carrier without signal.” The duty carrier, to
limit the time it deviated from the task force’s base course owing to turns into the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/6
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wind, would “adjust her position . . . in order to reduce separation [from the rest
of the task force] to a minimum.”31
The instructions also required multiple carriers in a task force to separate
“during air attacks or immediately prior thereto,” each carrier taking with it
“those cruisers and destroyers that can form screens in the shortest possible
time.”32 This was prewar doctrine, with the addition of lessons learned during the
carrier operations of 1942—that is, adaptation. It was repeated in Rear Admiral
DeWitt C. Ramsey’s “Maneuvering and Fire Doctrine for Carrier Task Forces” of
22 April 1943: “In the event of a threatened attack on a disposition containing
two or more carriers it is imperative that carriers separate, each carrier being accompanied by its own screen of ships previously assigned.” Moreover, “each carrier group shall control its own air operations and fighter direction. . . . Distances
between carrier groups shall be maintained between five and ten miles insofar as
practicable.”33
But change—innovation—was coming. Events were forcing it. On 1 March
1943, Admiral King’s headquarters issued the second classified “Battle Experience” bulletin, Solomon Islands Actions, August and September 1942. It was critical
of how screening destroyers assigned to protect carriers from submarine attacks
were maneuvering. Once the carrier they were escorting had launched or recovered aircraft, the escorts had been experiencing difficulty taking up the optimal
positions for protecting the carrier from submarine torpedo attack, allowing
Japanese submarines to penetrate the destroyer screen.34
Two weeks later, on 15 March 1943, Admiral King’s staff issued Battle Experience Bulletin No. 3, Solomon Islands Actions, October 1942. This classified analysis, with its focus on the battle near the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, did
not resolve the issue of how to best use the capabilities of multiple carriers in
battle. Vice Admiral Halsey, the senior carrier commander, believed that carriers
Enterprise and Hornet had been “too far apart for mutual cooperation and not far
enough apart for deception.”35 As Halsey observed, “due to the wide separation of
the carriers communications collapsed and fighter directing failed.”36 But Towers,
by 1943 the type commander for aircraft in the Pacific, argued that “the files of
the War College, the [Navy] Department, and the Fleet contain many thousands
of pages of discussion of the merits of separation of carriers vs their concentration. . . . I do not believe that an attempt to rehash this controversy can serve any
useful purpose here.” Towers favored the accepted tactic—keeping two carriers
together until the approach of an air attack and then dispersing them, bringing
them back together once the attack was over.37
Rear Admiral George Murray, who had commanded TF 17 (Hornet and its
escorts), supported Vice Admiral Towers: “It is too much to expect that a combat
air patrol of one task force can be controlled and coordinated with the same
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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degree of efficiency by the fighter direction officer of another task force. The
teamwork between the fighter direction officer and his own combat air patrol is
such an intimate one, because of constantly working together, much of the efficiency of this combination is lost when the fighter direction is taken over by an
entirely separate organization.”38 However, Osborne B. Hardison, the captain of
Enterprise, took a different view, insisting that “what is urgently needed is a sound
doctrine.” At Santa Cruz, on 26 October, the fighter direction team on Enterprise
had done what they had been trained to do, but their best effort had been overcome by events: “With some 38 of our fighters in the air, and with enemy planes
in large numbers coming in from various directions and altitudes, and with
friendly planes complicating the situation, then the system breaks down.”39
Something had to be done to resolve this months-long debate. The “something” was an idea developed before World War II—“extensive trials and experiments.” Rear Admiral Sherman and Captain Duckworth arrived at Pearl Harbor
with Enterprise and found the new large carrier Essex (CV 9) there, soon to be
followed by sister ships Yorktown (CV 10) and Lexington (CV 16). At about the
same time, three new Independence-class light carriers reached Pearl Harbor.
Sherman and Duckworth, watched by Towers, at last had enough ships and
planes to run experiments. The ships themselves had some new technology:
four-channel very-high-frequency (VHF) radios for the fighter-direction teams,
position-plan-indicator radar scopes for the new SK (air search) radars, a methodology for using the newly developed combat information centers (CICs), and
an understanding of how to use the SG (surface search) radar to facilitate safe
maneuvering at night and in thick weather. There was also the new fighter, the
F6F Hellcat, and information: friend or foe (IFF) transponders for all aircraft.40
The results of their experiments were fed into a team of three officers that
had been created by Admiral Nimitz on 13 April 1943 to rewrite the “Standard
Cruising Instructions for Carrier Task Forces.” One of the three was Captain
Apollo Soucek, who had been executive officer of Hornet at Santa Cruz. With
his colleagues, Soucek decided that they would—as their letter of 18 May to
Admiral Nimitz put it—exceed their “instructions to the extent that all existing
Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletins and numerous Fleet confidential letters” needed
to be overhauled. The result of their labors was Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and
Doctrine, known as PAC-10.41
PAC-10 was a dramatic innovation. It combined existing tactical publications,
tactical bulletins, task force instructions, and battle organization doctrine into
one doctrinal publication that applied to the whole fleet. Its goal was to make it
“possible for forces composed of diverse types, and indoctrinated under different
task force commanders, to join at sea on short notice for concerted action against
the enemy without interchanging a mass of special instructions.” 42 PAC-10’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/6
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instructions covered one-carrier and multicarrier task forces, and escort- or
light-carrier support operations of amphibious assaults. It established the basic
framework for the four-carrier task forces—with two Essex-class ships and two
of the Independence class—that would form the primary mobile striking arm of
the Pacific Fleet.43 However, it did this within the structure of a combined naval
force, a force composed of surface ships—including battleships and carriers.44
PAC-10 dealt with the issue of whether to concentrate or separate carriers
under air attack by redefining the problem: “Whether a task force containing two
or more carriers should separate into distinct groups . . . or remain tactically concentrated . . . may be largely dependent on circumstances peculiar to the immediate situation. No single rule can be formulated to fit all contingencies.”45 That is,
it basically said that the problem was not to develop hard and fast doctrine that
would cover all situations but to create guidance that could be tailored to the
situation at hand. PAC-10 also took advantage of the fact that fighter-direction
technology and techniques had matured. It was now possible for a fighter director to maintain a continuous plot of all detected aircraft, evaluate plots and warn
friendly ships of “impending air attack,” control “the number and disposition of
combat patrols,” take best advantage of the radar technology then being installed
on all the large carriers, and direct “the interception of enemy aircraft.” All new
air units were to be trained for participation in air defense of a carrier under the
direction of fighter directors. As PAC-10 put it, “with the composition of Task
Forces rapidly changing, it is essential that a new air unit be able to join a force
and assume its duties without receiving a mass of new instructions which are
inconsistent with prescribed practice.”46
PAC-10 solved two problems. First, “the creation of a single, common doctrine
allowed ships to be interchanged between task groups.” Second, “shifting the development of small-unit tactical doctrine to the fleet level and out of the hands
of individual commanders increased the effectiveness of all units, particularly the
fast-moving carrier task forces.”47 Put another way, PAC-10 was what Admiral
Nimitz had wanted for almost a year. It allowed him to hand to Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance a force that the latter could wield as he wished—with “lightning
speed,” speed that he could use to take the Japanese by surprise and keep them
off balance operationally as well as tactically.48
1943: PUTTING THE CHANGE TO WORK
The title of Battle Experience Bulletin No. 13, the description and analysis of
the attack on Wake Island on 5–6 October 1943, gives the game away: Dress
Rehearsal for Future Operations.49 That was it—the initiation in combat of the
new combined (and carrier-led) task force based on PAC-10. The new force had
been given its first test in the 31 August 1943 raid on Marcus Island, when Essex,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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Yorktown, and light carrier Independence combined their air groups, but the
sustained attack on Wake was proof that the transformed force could take the
offensive against Japanese land-based naval aviation and its torpedo-carrying
night-attack aircraft.
Why Marcus and Wake? Neither raid would telegraph the coming amphibious operation against the Gilberts, and Marcus was far enough away from the
Marianas to give the new carriers the chance to strike and withdraw to assess their
“lessons learned” without having a major Japanese carrier force to contend with.
The surviving planning documents give great credit to the ability of Japanese
sea-based and land-based aviation to initiate and respond to attack. Wake was
therefore the critical test, because it was in range of Japanese land-based naval
aviation. Wake was only 537 miles from Eniwetok, 594 miles from Kwajalein, and
640 miles from Wotje, all of which were thought to hold major land-based (and
long-range) air components. Wake was also just over two thousand miles from
Pearl Harbor. Once committed to attack Wake, the U.S. carrier force could not
easily or quickly withdraw to safer waters.
The carrier commander for the Wake raid was Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery. There were three carrier elements of his task group: one built around
Essex and Yorktown, a second based on Lexington and light carrier Cowpens, and
a third based on light carriers Independence and Belleau Wood. There were also
two bombardment groups, composed of cruisers and destroyers, and a task unit
composed of fleet oilers. Montgomery had at his disposal a combined force of
surface, aviation, and logistics task units, as well as the support of patrol planes
based on Midway Island.50 The aircraft from the carriers began their air assault
by gaining air superiority over Wake. As Rear Admiral Montgomery put it in his
report, “Well before noon 27 fighters had been shot down and all air opposition
appeared to be ended.”51 Moreover, the fighters flying from Independence and
Belleau Wood successfully protected both the carriers and the surface ships bombarding Wake from long-range bomber attacks. The patrols from these carriers
were so successful that Montgomery could claim that “no ship of this force was
ever attacked by enemy air.”52
Though the raid was a complete success, not everything worked well. Charts of
the area around Wake were not adequate, for example. The VHF circuits became
saturated because of inadequate radio discipline, and there were problems coordinating the movement of surface ships and the stationing of fighters to protect
them. But carrier night fighters had turned out to be a success, as had the use of
flight deck catapults on all the carriers.53 The utility of PAC-10 was affirmed. So
was the value of having combat information centers on all ships, including surface
ships covered by patrolling aircraft.54
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Lundstrom quotes Captain Duckworth as saying that the essential tactical
lessons for using multiple carriers had been demonstrated in 1942 and that “all
we did was apply them in the summer & fall of 1943.”55 But two other oftenunmentioned developments were essential if multicarrier U.S. task forces were
to raid far and wide across the Central Pacific. The first was the growing size and
sophistication of Vice Admiral William L. Calhoun’s Hawaii-based Service Force,
which kept the carriers and their escorts supplied with fuel and ordnance and
provided maintenance at forward anchorages. The second was the growing industrial capacity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. The yard’s ability to repair ships
damaged in battle is well documented, but the yard was also able to make sure
that new ships could get their defects corrected before they went to combat. For
example, between 21 and 30 October 1943, Yorktown was docked so that its SC-2
radar antenna could be repaired. The flight deck catapults on the light carriers
also needed to be inspected and repaired, and there were other “fixes” required
for equipment problems on the big carriers Bunker Hill and Lexington.56
The basic issue was whether and how the whole carrier force could successfully
support the planned offensive in the Central Pacific. Could the fast carriers raid
widely, keeping the Japanese on the defensive, while the escort carriers supported
the amphibious forces? Or would the new carriers have to do what Vice Admiral
Fletcher had been compelled to do in the Guadalcanal campaign—stay tied to the
amphibious assaults? To make matters even more uncertain, it was not clear how,
when, and in what manner the enemy would respond to the initial American
moves. If the Pacific Fleet went after the Gilberts, would the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s carrier and battleship forces sortie from Truk to engage it? Admirals Spruance and Towers both considered that a realistic option for the Japanese, though
they disagreed about how best to deal with it. Towers apparently wanted to take
the initiative and use the fast carrier force to strike the Japanese at Truk before
they could gather their forces for a fleet engagement.57
More generally, was Spruance’s Central Pacific Force (later the Fifth Fleet)
ready for its mission? Could the amphibious force, the land-based air arm, the
fast carriers, and the surface ships acting as fire support for the assault troops
work together effectively? Where the raids on Marcus and Wake had tested the
fast carriers, the assault on the Gilberts would test the whole force. The memory
of the Guadalcanal campaign influenced planning for the Gilberts invasion, but
as John Lundstrom points out, the offensive power of U.S. forces—especially the
carrier forces—had improved dramatically in one year. Rear Admiral Charles A.
Pownall’s six Essex-class carriers and five Independence-class light carriers fielded
almost seven hundred aircraft, and eight new escort carriers had among them just
over two hundred planes. Vice Admiral Fletcher, by contrast, had commanded
only 234 carrier aircraft while defending Guadalcanal in 1942.58
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The assault on the Gilbert Islands was a success. Even the weather cooperated.
An “eastsoutheasterly wind of 12–15 knots . . . greatly facilitated our carrier air
operations; reduced by one half the fuel expenditure of the carrier task groups . . .
and so permitted us to build up a fuel reserve that removed any concern over
shortage of fuel.”59 Though the “forces destined for the operation were widely dispersed at the beginning of the assembly and training period,” they were trained
and brought together in time to conduct the operation.60 The commander of the
force that assaulted Tarawa, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, complimented the performance of the carrier striking groups and especially praised the performance
of the escort carriers, which had supported the ground forces.61 Vice Admiral
Towers echoed this praise, adding that “for the first time in history Carrier Night
Fighters, operating from a Carrier at sea, were successfully employed against our
enemy.”62
Towers, Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and others had argued long and
hard against the plan to use the carriers as a shield against Japanese attacks from
the Marshalls directed against the amphibious units attacking and occupying the
Gilberts. Towers wanted to strike by surprise the Japanese airfields in the Marshalls before the invasion and then continue to strike them. As it happened, the
carrier task forces were surprisingly good at combining antiaircraft fire and radical maneuvers to blunt the Japanese night attacks by torpedo-carrying aircraft.63
These measures, combined with night-fighter defense, meant that the fast carriers
could protect themselves from the tactic that was the basis of Japanese night anticarrier doctrine. Put another way, the weaknesses in carrier defensive measures
revealed initially during the raid on Wake were being steadily overcome.
The fast carrier task force had largely proved itself by the end of 1943. The
elements of the force, which included powerful surface escorts, could disperse
to raid Japanese bases and then concentrate to shield the amphibious units that
were taking away the land bases that the Japanese needed to maintain an effective defense. For example, on 5 November, before the amphibious assault on the
Gilberts (to begin on 20 November 1943), Rear Admiral Sherman’s two-carrier
task force struck the Japanese base at Rabaul, in the Bismarck Archipelago. Then
Sherman’s force was joined by Rear Admiral Montgomery’s three carriers from
Spruance’s Central Pacific Force to strike Rabaul yet again, on 11 November.
After that mission, both task forces hightailed it for the Gilberts, arriving in time
to support the amphibious assaults as scheduled. Once the Gilberts had been
secured, the carriers of Rear Admiral Pownall’s Task Force 50 attacked Wotje and
Kwajalein, in the Marshalls, and then Nauru, west of the Gilberts. The improved
defenses of carrier task forces and the ability of different carrier air groups to coordinate their strikes meant that “it was possible to disperse [carrier task forces]
and strike multiple targets simultaneously.”64
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MORE PROGRESS IN 1944
The successful campaign against the Marshalls showed that the new fleet design,
centered arovund carrier task forces but including battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, was a success. The mobility of the carrier task forces, coupled with the
ability of the amphibious forces to make landings “over widely scattered areas,”
kept the Japanese from “mounting a successful defense at any one place” and
prevented effective coordination of their land-based defenses and their seaborne
forces.65 As the U.S. Navy moved forward, it created bases for many squadrons
of land-based long-range Army and Navy bombers, and those aircraft mounted
further and frequent attacks on Japanese installations.
The U.S. Navy’s carrier task forces increased the tempo of their raids after
the conquest of the Gilberts. The fast carrier task force (TF 50), composed of
six Essex-class and six Independence-class carriers and commanded by Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, gained control of the air over Kwajalein and Majuro on
29 January 1944, bombarded Wotje and Taroa, and covered the assaults on Roi
and Namur on 1 February. On 16–17 February, TF 50 raided the main Japanese
base at Truk, thereafter covering the U.S. amphibious assault on Eniwetok. On 21
February, as part of an effort to squelch Japanese air attacks staged from bases in
the Marianas, the newly designated Task Force 58, under Rear Admiral Mitscher,
began attacking Japanese air bases on Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam. 66
Task Force 58 was created to concentrate “the main combatant strength of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet in fast carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,” in order to “guard against any attempt by the Japanese Fleet” to disrupt U.S. amphibious operations.67 At the same time, the elements of this task force, in cooperation
with land-based aircraft flying from the Gilberts, were used to neutralize enemy
bases. According to Admiral King’s staff, “This program was actually carried out
to the letter, and was completely successful.”68 Put another way, Task Force 58 was
both sword and shield.
The planning for the Marshalls campaign also accounted for the possibility of
a major fleet action. In case the Japanese battleships appeared, “the plan called for
all battleships and cruisers (except some [antiaircraft cruisers] and some of the
destroyers) from both the Carrier Force and from the Joint Expeditionary Force
to form the battle line directly under Admiral Spruance.”69 The adoption of PAC10 had made this possible, and the plan for the Marshalls campaign shows the
effects of PAC-10’s implementation. Task Force 58, for instance, “comprised actually all the new battleship strength of the Pacific Fleet, plus a considerable part
of the cruiser and destroyer strength.”70 Yet the plan assumed that the battleships
and cruisers could be pulled out of TF 58 in short order and used as a coherent
surface force against a similar force of Japanese ships. Such a dramatic tactical
change had not been possible in 1942.
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The new Pacific Fleet matured in the Marshalls campaign for a number of
reasons. First, the doctrine in PAC-10 facilitated effective tactical cooperation
among combatants and task forces. Second, Admiral Nimitz had restructured
his headquarters in the fall of 1943 to provide his subordinate commanders with
accurate and useful intelligence on the Japanese. The creation of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) had “ended the dispute between
[Washington] D.C.–based intelligence activities and those at Pearl Harbor.” 71
Nimitz’s staff also revised the way that intelligence (including signals intelligence) would flow to the operations planners. By the time that planning for the
Marshalls operation was under way, Vice Admiral Spruance’s staff could request
and expect to receive accurate and detailed information about Japanese forces
and their bases.72
Third, Vice Admiral Calhoun’s Service Force had gained the ships and the
skills necessary to sustain the rapid offensive in the Central Pacific. Calhoun’s
command had created and deployed Service Squadron 10, which anchored in the
lagoon at Majuro after Admiral Turner’s amphibious force had captured Kwajalein in January. Service Squadron 10 was at the end of a long logistics “pipeline”
that delivered ammunition, food, and replacement aircraft from the continental
United States to Hawaii and other bases and then to the carrier task forces at sea.73
Service Squadron 8 was the mobile source of oil and aviation gasoline. Together,
the mobile service squadrons gave the fast carrier task force an extraordinary
mobility—a mobility that in 1944 allowed the Pacific Fleet to combine its Central
Pacific offensive with General Douglas MacArthur’s South Pacific drive toward
the Philippines from New Guinea.
The records of operations in the winter of 1943–44 also indicate a growing sophistication in air operations planning. For example, plans for strikes against carriers in 1942 had stressed coordinating the attacks of torpedo and dive-bomber
squadrons so that a “pulse” of combat power arrived over the target, dividing and
saturating the enemy carrier’s defenses. This was difficult to do; U.S. carrier aircraft did not do it at Midway, for example. However, by the time that Task Force
58 task groups attacked Jaluit and Truk in February 1944, the emphasis was on
“a continuous flow of striking groups into the target area, preceded by an initial
fighter strike each morning.”74 Given the mission, which was raiding defended
Japanese bases, this stress on the effective flow of aircraft delivering ordnance
was sound. So too was the concern for night torpedo attacks by Japanese aircraft.
Night fighters were available to counter these Japanese night attacks, but the
decision to use these aircraft was left to the task group commanders. As annex
C of the operations plan for these raids noted, it was hazardous to recover the
fighters at night and dangerous to steam steadily into the wind with Japanese
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night-fighting forces (which included submarines and surface ships, as well as
twin-engine bombers) in the vicinity.75
In May 1944, Vice Admiral Mitscher issued special task force instructions
(known as FastCar TFI-1), noting that they followed but did not replace the direction provided by the instruction USF-10(A), which was the U.S. Fleet version
of PAC-10.76 FastCar TFI-1 was based on the assumption that for the immediate
future, multicarrier operations would consist of “heavy carrier raids on major
enemy bases . . . and heavy raids on enemy bases and areas followed immediately
by assault and occupation by Amphibious forces.”77 The pattern for these raids
had been tested and found reliable: “After complete control of the air is attained,
then strike aircraft are used to support the actual assault operations. . . . In either
of the above cases, the Task Force Air Plan provides for the coordination of the
many attacking groups in order to obtain a maximum delivery of strikes on the
primary objectives in an orderly and continuous flow. This can best be accomplished by roughly dividing the air groups in half and launching ‘deck loads’ at a
time, each ‘deck load’ a complete striking group.”78
TFI-1 also dealt with the risk taken by task groups (which together made up
the task force) when they separated in order to launch and recover strikes. Because they would often lose direct communication with each other when they
separated, doctrine did not have the task force commander always act as the Force
Fighter Director, and therefore it was essential that each task group have an effective fighter-director staff. As TFI-1 put it, “Unless otherwise directed by the Task
Force Commander, each Task Group will assume independent control for fighter
direction purposes.” This doctrine would not work, however, unless each fighterdirection team maintained a continuous plot of all friendly aircraft. Otherwise,
friendly fighters from one task group would likely engage friendly fighters from
other task groups.79
With the Marshalls secured, the Marianas were next, and Admiral Spruance,
the commander of the attacking U.S. forces, had to assume that the Japanese
might seek a decisive fleet engagement after first wearing down his carrier aviation. At the same time, Spruance’s carrier forces had to shield the amphibious
assault from any Japanese “end run” against it. In what came to be called the
battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance therefore chose to shield the
amphibious force—despite the argument by Vice Admiral Mitscher that U.S.
carriers could destroy the Japanese carrier force and, in so doing, best shield the
amphibious units assaulting Saipan. Spruance was to be criticized for not doing
what Mitscher advised, but his decision was consistent with his concept of the
Central Pacific campaign as a series of amphibious assaults that would move U.S.
land-based aviation close enough to the Japanese home islands to begin longrange bombing.
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What is more interesting is Operation Plan 14-44 of 1 August 1944, Admiral
Halsey’s scheme to assault Peleliu, in the Palau Islands. The immediate objective
was to begin the process of isolating the Philippines in anticipation of their eventual conquest. But the operations plan made it clear that Halsey’s planners hoped
that the Japanese fleet would come out to fight: “In case opportunity for the
destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such
destruction will become the primary task.”80 Annex A (“Battle Concepts”) to 1444 assumed that the Japanese would in fact attack, that Japanese “carrier strikes
in force may be expected but the enemy is not likely to close for decisive surface
action unless he has been successful in inflicting heavy damage by air strikes
on our forces.” Annex A also assumed that “our fast carrier forces will have had
time to complete their initial bombardment missions and are substantially intact
prior to an enemy threat developing but may not have had time for completion
of refueling and replenishment.”81
The plan outlined in annex A had Mitscher’s fast carrier task force (TF 38)
“seek out the enemy and launch a concentrated air strike against his major units.”
For this to be most effective, the carriers were to “be maneuvered in such a manner as to permit the simultaneous launching by all groups present of the maximum air strike against the enemy at the earliest daylight period to insure completion prior dark.” Mitscher would command this operation if it took place.82 If
there were a major daylight surface engagement, Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee’s Task
Force 34, the “Heavy Surface Striking Force,” would attack the Japanese.83 If the
Japanese chose to attack at night, as their surface forces had done at Guadalcanal,
Lee’s TF 34 would engage them. If they tried to reinforce Peleliu with “Tokyo
Express” runs by destroyers and light cruisers, then TF 35, a force of cruisers and
destroyers under Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth, would intercept them.84
What is important about this operation plan is that it was a whole-force plan. It
followed the injunction of PAC-10 to bring all available combat power to bear on
the enemy, using forces that shared a common tactical doctrine.
Halsey’s focus on bringing the Japanese fleet to a dramatic engagement was
just as clear in Battle Plan No. 1-44 of 9 September 1944—the plan in place for
the battle of Leyte Gulf. That plan assumed that the Japanese fleet “or a major
portion thereof is at sea and there is possibility of creating an opportunity to
engage it decisively.” As Halsey directed, the Third Fleet “will seek the enemy
and attempt to bring about a decisive engagement if he undertakes operations
beyond close support of superior land based air forces.”85 The “optimum plan,”
for Halsey, was to strike the Japanese with both his aviation and surface forces,
and he was willing to withdraw the amphibious units in order to fight his desired
decisive engagement.86 As annex A to Third Fleet’s plan 1-44 put it, “The plan for
coordinated use of forces does not discourage use of carrier strikes if enemy is
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found within range of aircraft. Particular effort, however, will be made to gain a
position from which a predawn carrier strike may be launched concurrently with
release [sic] of fast heavy striking force from a favorable attack position.”87
The image of Admiral Halsey’s fleet that is contained in his September 1944
battle plan is that of a combined force—not a carrier force but a combined force.
The mission of that combined force was the same in 1944 as it had been in the
many operational-level war games conducted at the Naval War College in the two
decades before World War II—to bring the Japanese fleet to decisive battle and
defeat it. Though the “long-awaited clash of battle lines never occurred,” the fast
battleships “were an essential element of the Navy’s plan for decisive battle and
therefore collectively an essential part of the campaign.”88 Put another way, what
took place during the war was not a simple substitution of carriers for battleships
but the creation of a modern, combined-arms fleet, one that included submarines and land-based aviation. That was the innovation.
INTEGRATION TO FORM A NEW ORGANIZATION
The first argument of this article—the one to which most of the article has been
dedicated—is that what Navy officers developed in the Pacific in World War II
was not a carrier force but a combined force. Indeed, all the elements of this force
grew in sophistication during the war and because of the war. Before the war,
for example, carriers were hit-and-run weapons—raiders. This was not a trivial
role, as Navy officers recognized, and it remained a central mission of carriers all
through the war. But before 1944 there were hardly enough carrier aircraft for
naval officers to become adept at planning and staging mass air attacks, especially
against land targets. Shielding amphibious forces was perceived before World
War II as a dangerous mission for carriers. But by 1944—certainly by the time
Admiral Halsey’s planners were preparing the assault on Peleliu—the Pacific
Fleet’s air forces were prepared both for a carrier battle and for protecting an
amphibious assault.
By 1944, the Navy’s fast carrier task forces were a major operational-level
weapon. Combined with surface escorts and sustained by mobile service and supply
units, carrier task forces could roam widely and gain air superiority over large areas. The carrier task forces were therefore put to work sustaining the amphibious
offensive against Japan in the Central Pacific. The purpose of the Central Pacific
campaign was to put land-based, long-range bombers in range of Japanese cities
and simultaneously to force the Japanese fleet to devote its resources to defending
against the wide-ranging U.S. carrier task forces—instead of defending against
the effective submarine offensive against Japanese shipping. In the process, the
Pacific Fleet’s air and surface striking units destroyed or immobilized the striking
power of the Japanese fleet.
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The second argument of this article is that the total force created under Admiral Nimitz was the basis of the modern Navy. Under Nimitz, the total, combined
fleet was created and successfully used. But also under Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet
created a modern support “infrastructure”—the intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and planning organizations so essential to the operation of a highly mobile and powerful forward-deployed striking force. The two developments went
hand in hand. Halsey’s Battle Plan No. 1-44, for example, could not have been
feasible without the intelligence, planning, communications, and logistics support developed under Nimitz’s leadership. Similarly, all of Nimitz’s efforts to create a fleet-support infrastructure would have been of little use if the Navy had not
had the talents of several superb (though not faultless) operational commanders.
Fleet officers also created PAC-10, a doctrine that pulled together the fleet as it
had never been united before. Yet PAC-10 did not freeze tactical and operationallevel thinking—quite the reverse. PAC-10 did what doctrine should do, which is
to give a force tactical cohesion so that it has energy to spare for dealing with the
inevitable unexpected challenges. One such challenge emerged in late 1944—the
kamikaze, which was in effect a manned missile.
I do not believe that the historians of the changes in the Pacific Fleet during
World War II have captured this insight. There are good biographies of Nimitz,
Mitscher, Spruance, Towers, and Fletcher. But often the biographers have been
participants in the inevitable disputes that preoccupied and sometimes divided
the top commanders themselves. Thomas Buell, for example, defended Spruance; Clark Reynolds defended Towers; E. B. Potter (and Samuel Eliot Morison)
admired Nimitz; and Lundstrom carefully investigated Fletcher’s actions during
the war to amend what Lundstrom thought had been unfair criticisms. Though
interesting, useful, and sometimes extraordinary research efforts, their biographies have distracted students of naval warfare from what really mattered, which
was the creation of a modern combined-arms navy with operational reach. This
article is an effort to shift the focus from particular “champions” to the process
that the senior officers went through, which was one of integrating technology,
tactics, and human beings to form a new organization.
This process was messy, and those engaged in it were often critical of one another’s views (and sometimes bitterly so of each other’s motives). But they kept
at it, and the growing maturity of the fleet that they were creating is evident from
its written records. But the story of that growing maturity has, in my opinion,
been obscured by a mythology that portrays the rise of the combined force as in
fact the rise of a carrier force. Today’s officers do not really know where the Navy
they command came from. The evidence of where that Navy came from exists, it
is true, but it is obscured by a mythology continued in books, articles, and films.
This is unfortunate, to say the least, and this article has been an attempt to move
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away from that mythology and toward useful insights into the development of
the modern U.S. Navy.
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